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COMMENTS

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The right of privacy has only recently received legal recognition in
the courts. It was unknown to the common law, and has existed in legal
contemplation little more than a half century. Since its inception into the
law, it has enjoyed a constantly expanding body of jurisprudence, upon
which is being based the enlarged protection of one's private affairs
against intrusions which are unwarranted and unauthorized.
As a legally recognized concept, by far the most widely accepted
definition of the right of privacy is that submitted by Professor Cooley,
who described it as "the right to be let alone."' This phraseology was
adopted and expanded by a Kentucky court in the leading case of
Brents v. Morgan,2 where it was held to be:
...the right to be let alone, that is, the right of a person to be free from

unwarranted publicity, or the right to live without unwarranted interference
by the public about matters with which the public is not necessarily
concerned.8
Although the common law courts took no cognizance of a "right to
be let alone," mainly because there was little need to develop such a
right in an English society which was loosely organized and in which
news traveled so very slowly, 4 American courts, in applying the common law, found it their duty to determine that such a right existed therein, whether found in prior decisions or not.5 The necessity for such
1 1 Cooley, Torts 360 (3d ed., 1906). Prosser defines the right of privacy as one
"which will be protected against interferences which are serious, and outrageous, or
beyond the limits of common ideas of decent conduct. The right has been held to
cover intrusions upon the plaintiff's solitude, publicity given to his name or likeness,
or to private information about him, and the commercial appropriation of elements
of his personality." Prosser, Torts 1050 (1941).
2221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).

8 Ibid., at 772 and 970. Similarly, a New Jersey court has said, "The right of privacy
is the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted publicity, or in other
words, to be protected from any wrongful intrusion into his private life which would
outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary
sensibilities." McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 32, 43 A. 2d 514, 518 (1946).
See also Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942); Kerby v. Hal
Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P. 2d 577 (1942).
441 Ill. Bar J. 121 (1952), noting Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill.
App. 293,
106 N.E. 2d 742 (1952): "Contrast the society of today in which modem inventions
project news and advertising into the minds of millions of persons every day, making
it possible for one's private affairs to be laid before millions in a matter of minutes."
Ibid., at 121.
5Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Eick v.
Perk Dog Food Co., 347 IM. App. 293, 106 N.E. 2d 742 (1952); Hinish v. Meier &
Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P. 2d 438 (1941). A more complete analysis of the
courts that have recognized the existence of the right of privacy will be found
infra., in text above n. 29.
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protection is clearly evident in a society as complex as ours, and in which
the media of mass communication play so great a part. "Certainly some
aspects of a man's life may be entirely claimed by him as his own."
With one exception, 7 no state that has dealt with the problem has
expressly denied the existence of the right of privacy. The Restatement
of Torts gives recognition to the .right and defines it, as follows:
A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest
in not having his affairs
known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public
8
is liable to the other.
Contributing greatly to the establishment of the right of privacy as
a legally cognizable interest was an article written by Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis, which appeared in 1890. 9 Therein the authors
introduced and defined the right as one independent and distinct from
other rights, and argued for its recognition as such. 10 Nevertheless, many
courts were reluctant to establish a distinct right of privacy on the
theory that to do so would be to engage in judicial legislation. Thus in
the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.," the court denied
the existence of the right and refused injunctive relief when the defendant made use of a picture of plaintiff to advertise its flour, but
suggested that a legislative body might ". . . provide that no one should
be permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the picture or name of
another for advertising purposes without his consent."'1 2 In apparent
conformity therewith, the New York legislature, at the next session,
enacted a statute giving a right of action to one whose name or portrait
has been used for advertising or trade purposes without his consent. 13
Similar statutes have been enacted in Utah 14 and Virginia. 15
Three years after the Roberson case, the Supreme Court of Georgia,
6Harper, Torts § 277 (1933), wherein it was stated further, "The decencies of
civilization require a certain consideration on the part of society for the desire of
an individual to live, in some respects, to himself, quite as they require, in certain
respects, that he live unto others." Ibid., at 601.
7

Henry v. Cherry and Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 Atd. 97 (1909).

8 Rest., Torts § 867 (1939).
9 The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
10 Ibid., at 214. It has been said, "The recognition and development of the so-called

'right of privacy' is perhaps the outstanding illustration of the influence of legal
periodicals upon the courts." Prosser, Torts 1050 (1941).
11 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
12

Ibid., at 545 and 443.

18 N.Y. Civil Rights Law S § 50, 51.
14 Utah Code Ann. § 103-4-9 (1943).

15 Code of Va. § 8-650 (1950).
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in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 16 was confronted squarely with
the question of whether or not there existed a legally recognized right
of privacy. The court determined that the right existed and that the
unauthorized use of the photograph of another for advertising purposes
was a violation of that right. Since that time, more and more courts have
taken cognizance of the right of privacy, and today decisions have
established the right in approximately twenty jurisdictions, 17 exclusive
of those states which have enacted the above-mentioned statutes.
Not all of the courts, however, have recognized the existence of an

independent right of privacy. A number have predicated recovery upon
the violation of some other right, such as contract, express or implied,",
defamation, 19 or some property right.20 One of the important factors
contributing to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the right
earlier, and which today hampers the courts in granting relief without
21
There
the aid of a fiction is the famous decision in Gee v. Pritchard.
it was said, in effect, by way of dictum, that equity will not grant its
relief for the protection of personal rights, except as an incident to the
protection of a property interest. Adhering to this principle, the court
in Prince Albert v. Strange2 2 held that relief could not be granted where
there was no property right being invaded. Likewise, the Missouri court
in Munden v. Harris23 expressed a similar view when it said:
One may have peculiarity of appearance, and if it is to be made a matter
of merchandise, why should it not be for his benefit? It is a right which he
may wish to exercise for his own profit, and why may he not restrain another
who is using it for gain? If there is value in it, sufficient to excite the cupidity
of another, why is it not the2 4property of him who gives it the value and
from whom the value springs?
16 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
17 Alabama, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. Although Minnesota has not
as yet allowed recovery, a federal court sitting in that state seemed to assume the
existence of the right in Berg v. The Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp.
957 (D.C. Minn., 1948).
18 McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P. 2d 803 (1936); Bennett
v. Gusdorf, 101 Mont. 39, 53 P. 2d 91 (1935); Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 C.
Div. 345 (1888).
19 Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 167 N.W. 584 (1918).
20
Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34 (1929); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo.
App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & S. 652, 64 Eng.
Rep. 293 (1849).
21 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
22 2 De G. & S. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
23 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911).
24 Ibid., at 659 and 1078. It is noteworthy that in the later Missouri case of Barber
v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942), Ibid., at 1205-6 and 295, the
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Warren and Brandeis 25 recognized this problem and pointed out that
protection had been given the right of privacy for many years under
the guise of a violation of property interests, trust relationships, and
contractual rights. In 1905 the Supreme Court of Georgia 2 6 in recognizing the right of privacy as one distinct from other rights, further
pointed out that prior to 1890,
. every case in this country and in England, which might be said to have
involved a right of privacy, was not based upon the existence of such right,
but was founded upon a supposed right of property, or a breach of trust or
confidence, or the like, and that therefore a claim independent of a property
or contractual right, or some right of a similar27nature, had, up to that time,
never been recognized in terms in any decision.
..

The majority of courts that have had the question before them, however, have taken what would seem to be the more enlightened view, and
have acknowledged the existence of an independent right of privacy
without declaring the fictional presence of a property or contract right
upon which to base incidental recovery. This ever-expanding number
of jurisdictions may be said to have adhered to the view that in every
human being there resides the inalienable legal right, based upon natural
law, to be free from unwarranted exploitation of his personality. 28 Thus,
in line with the modern trend, decisions which acknowledge the right
to privacy as a basic human right may be found in Arizona, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
and South Carolina 2 9 though other prior decisions within many of
court threw off the fiction that cloaked the right and said, "If the court decides
that the matter is outside the scope of proper public interest and that there is substantial evidence tending to show a serious, unreasonable, unwarranted and offensive
interference with another's private affairs, then the case is one to be submitted to
the jury."
2 The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
26

Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
27 Ibid., at 191 and 69.
28 Consult 41 Am. Jur., Privacy §§ 20-33 (1942); also Annotations, The Right of
Privacy, 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942); 168 A.L.R. 446 (1947); and 14 A.L.R. 2d 750 (1950).
2
9Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.C. Dist. Col., 1948); Reed v. Real
Detective Publ. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. 2d 133 (1945); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla.
198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E.
68 (1905); State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E. 2d 755 (1946); Kunz
v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765. 299 S.W.
967 (1927); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Pallas v. Crowley
Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W. 2d 911 (1948); Frey v. Dixon, 141 N.J. Eq.
481, 58 A. 2d 86 (1948); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55
(1938); Friedman v. Cincinnatti Local Joint Exec. Bd., 20 Ohio Ops. 473 (1941);
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those same jurisdictions have recognized the right of privacy as an "incident" of the protection of some other right, such as a property or con0
tract right or trust relationship, which has been violated. Illinois, the
most recent jurisdiction to take legal cognizance of the right to privacy,"'
has joined the ranks of the majority of courts and has repudiated fictional
bases for the right, declaring that the ". . . law will take cognizance of
an injury even though no right of property or contract may be involved
and even though the damages resulting are exclusively those of mental
anguish."81 2 Somewhat analogous to the theory of a natural right are
the arguments advanced by those jurisdictions which predicate recovery
constitutional guarantee of life, liberty and
upon the violation of the
38
the pursuit of happiness.
The scope of the right, in its practical application as reflected by the
decisions, is varied indeed. By far the greatest number of cases have
involved the appropriation of the plaintiff's likeness for some unauthorized
commercial use 8 4 but this is by no means the only interest of personality
5
protected. In Barber v. Time, Inc.,3 where the defendant magazine
printed in its medicine department a picture of plaintiff in her hospital
gown, with a caption of "Starving Glutton," and a paragraph or two
identifying the plaintiff and explaining the nature of her illness, the
court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff and said:
While the plaintiff's ailment may have been a matter of some public interest
because unusual, certainly the identity of the person who had suffered this
ailment was not. Whatever the limits of the right of privacy may be, it seems
that it must include the right to have information given to a physician in the
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P. 2d 438 (1941); Waring v. W.D.A.S.
Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 AtI. 631, concurring opinion Justice Maxey
(1937); Holloman v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E. 2d 169 (1940);
Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E. 2d 742 (1952).
80 Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930): A relationship of trust and confidence; Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912):
Breach of trust and confidence; DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881):
Assault and Battery; Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 Ad. 34 (1929): A property
right; Pritchett v. Board of Comm's of Knox County, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N.E. 32
(1908): Nuisance; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911): A
property right.
81Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E. 2d 742 (1952).

32

Ibid., at 299 and 745.

3 8 Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942); Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
84 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Foster
Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W 68 (1905); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co.,
347 Ifl. App. 293, 106 N.E. 2d 742 (1952).

a5 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942).
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treatment of an individual's personal ailment kept from publication which
would state his name in connection therewith without such person's consent.36
In a recent California case3 7 the court allowed recovery for the publication in the Ladies' Home Journal of a photograph of a husband and
wife in an affectionate position as a part of a story on "Love," as not
being warranted by public need. The picture was captioned "Publicized
as glamorous, desirable, 'love at first sight' is a bad risk." The court said:
Assuming it to be within the range of public interest in dissemination of
news, information or education, and in a medium that would not be classed
as commercial-for profit or advertising-there appears no necessity for the
use in connection with the article without their consent, of a photograph of
the plaintiffs. 8
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Columbia, in a case
involving the unauthorized publication of plaintiff's photograph in conjunction wth a satirical article appearing in a national magazine, decided
that the plaintiff's right of privacy had been invaded. 9
It is not necessary, however, that it be one's likeness which is appropriated without consent. Disclosures by other means of incidents of
the plaintiff's life have also been held to be within the purview of the
protection afforded by the right of privacy, such as placarding a debtor,
as in Brents v. Morgan, where the defendant, a creditor of the plaintiff, placed a sign covering a space five feet by eight feet in his shop
window informing the public that the plaintiff owed him a bill of $49.67
which was long overdue. 40 Likewise, in a Louisiana case recovery was
allowed when the court found that the improper and unnecessary display of a photograph of a person suspected of a crime in a "rogues gallery"
was an invasion of the right of privacy. 41 Similarly, the plaintiff was
given a right of action where the defendant installed an apparatus in his
42
hospital room to hear the plaintiff's conversations.
While being far from exhaustive, the cases mentioned above serve
to illustrate the diversity of situations which come within the right of
privacy doctrine. As we have said, the great bulk of the cases have
86

Ibid., at 1207-8 and 295.

37

Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P. 2d 630 (1952).

S8Ibid., at 634.

39 Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (Dist. Col., 1948).
40 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927). The sign read, "'Notice' Doctor W. R. Morgan
owes an account here of $49.67. And if promises would pay an account, this ac-

count would have been settled long ago. This account will be advertised

as

long as

it remains unpaid." Ibid., at 767 and 970.
41 Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
42

McDaniel v. Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E. 2d 810

(1939).
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involved the unauthorized appropriation of some element of the plaintiff's personality for a commercial use, as where the plaintiff's photograph
is used in the defendant's advertising. 43 One of the most recent cases,
and one
of first impression in Illinois, is that of Eick v. Perk Dog Food
4
Co.," where the defendant, in conducting a prize contest to advertise

and promote the sale of its product, printed a picture of the plaintiff, a
blind girl, on various contest entry blanks, posters, and newspaper advertisements, as well as on labels of its dog food. The court allowed recovery and held that the unauthorized appropriation and use of a person's
likeness for commercial purposes is such a violation of that person's right
of privacy as to give rise to a cause of action sounding in tort for
damages.
Of equally great weight and importance are the limitations put upon
the right of privacy. It is well settled that the right is subject to certain
limitations and that it will not prohibit the publication of matter which
is of legitimate public interest. 45 Warren and Brandeis recognized the
need for these limitations in their article46 and the Restatement of the
Law of Torts points out that "One who is not a recluse must expect the
ordinary incidents of community life, of which he is a part. .. ."147Certainly, the right of the individual to privacy must be balanced against the
interests of society. Privacy, therefore, is not an absolute right, in the
sense that it is always paramount to the rights of the public. While the
courts have been quite liberal in finding a violation of the right where
there is no legitimate public concern,4 8 they have steadfastly held that
the right does not exist as to persons and events in which the public has
a rightful interest.
4 Supra note 33; see also Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33
N.W. 2d 911 (1948); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E. 2d
306 (1949).
44 347 IMI.App. 293, 106 N.E. 2d 742 (1952).
45 Berg v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D.C. Minn., 1948);
Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. 2d 133 (1945); Metter v. Los
Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P. 2d 491 (1939); Eick v. Perk Dog Food
Co., 347 Ill.
App. 293, 106 N.E. 2d 742 (1952).
46

Op. cit. Supra note 9, at 218.

867 Comment (c) (1939). "Likewise if he submits himself or his work for
public approval, as does a candidate for public office, a public official, an actor, an
author, or a stunt aviator, he must necessarily pay the price of even unwelcome
publicity through reports upon his private life and photographic reproductions of
himself and his family, unless these are defamatory or exceed the bounds of fair
comment."
48
That is to say, once established, truth is no defense, Barber v. Time, Inc., 348
Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942); malice need not be shown, Cason v. Baskin, 155
Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); and mistake as a defense is without merit, Kerby v.
Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P. 2d 577 (1942).
47 S
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In Berg v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 49 where the plaintiff's
photograph, taken in a courtroom, was published in a newspaper, the
court said:
By the accepted standards of most of the newspapers in this country ...
court proceedings such as the Berg contest over the custody of the children
constitute legitimate news in view of the circumstances related, and the
publication of Berg's picture in connection with the legitimate news was
within the scope of the accepted prerogatives assumed by the press, which
is charged with the responsibility of furnishing news to the public.50
Similarly, where the plaintiff's name was mentioned in connection with
a news report of his wife's suicide, the court held that there was no
violation of the right of privacy. 51 Thus we see that the individual's right
of privacy must give way to the paramount interests of the public in
obtaining information of public concern.
So, too, must it give way where the publication concerns people in
public life. It is obvious that a man in public life may not claim the
same immunity from publicity as may a private citizen. One who engages
in public affairs to an extent which draws the public interest upon him
52
may be deemed to have consented to the publication of his picture.
5
3
This was clearly pointed up in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., where the
plaintiff, who was a well-known football player, was denied recovery
on a cause of action arising out of the publication of his likeness in an
advertisement. We see, then, that whether by actual or implied consent,
or by estoppel, it is well settled that the protection afforded by the right
54
may be lost or waived.
In any event, the establishment of conditions of liability for the invasion of the right of privacy is a matter of harmonizing individual
rights with community and social interests. As yet, however, no rigid
line of demarcation has enclosed the right, and, at the present time, it
may be said that an ever-expanding number of American states have now
given definite legal cognizance to the right of an individual "to be let
alone."
49 79 F. Supp. 957 (D.C. Minn., 1948).
50

Ibid., at 962.

51 Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P. 2d 491 (1939).
52

Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 Adt. 392 (1907).

53 124 F. 2d 167 (C.A. 5th, 1941).
54

Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Metter
v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P. 2d 491 (1939); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E. 2d 306 (1949); Munden v. Harris, 153
Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911).

